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DRAFT 10/8/21
The International Tax Regime at 100: Reflections on the OECD's BEPS Project
Reuven Avi-Yonah1
ABSTRACT
This essay will consider the outcome of Pillars One and Two, as reflected in the October 2021
statement by the Inclusive Forum, in light of the history of international taxation since the
foundation of the international tax regime in 1923. Specifically, it will consider how Pillar One
fits with efforts to redefine the source of active income in light of the digital revolution, and the
ways in which Pillar Two implements the single tax principle, which can be traced back to the
first model treaty from 1927. Both of those ideas were already articulated and developed in my
own early writing on international taxation from the 1990s, when the Internet was in its
infancy.
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1. The Two Pillars of BEPS 2.0: Evolution or Revolution?
In L’ancien Regime et la Revolution (1856) Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the major
innovations of the French revolution were prefigured in developments during the old
regime, so that the revolution was less of a sharp dividing line than previously thought.
This essay will make a similar argument for the current revolution in international
taxation contained in the two pillars of BEPS 2.0, as laid out in the October 2021
statement by the Inclusive Forum. Specifically, I will argue that Pillar One derives from
efforts to redefine the source of active income in light of the digital revolution, which
build on US state taxation use of sales factors since 1911 as a source of corporate
income, while Pillar Two implements the single tax principle, which can be traced back
to the first model treaty from 1927. Both of those ideas were already articulated and
developed in my own early writing on international taxation from the 1990s, when the
Internet was in its infancy.
2. The Origins of Pillar One
a. Pillar One2
The OECD/ Inclusive Forum Statement on the outcome of the BEPS 2.0 negotiations
(October 8, 2021), describes Pillar One as follows:
Pillar One
Scope
In-scope companies are the multinational enterprises (MNEs) with global turnover
above 20 billion euros and profitability above 10% (i.e. profit before tax/revenue)
calculated using an averaging mechanism with the turnover threshold to be reduced
to 10 billion euros, contingent on successful implementation including of tax
certainty on Amount A, with the relevant review beginning 7 years after the
agreement comes into force, and the review being completed in no more than one
year.
Extractives and Regulated Financial Services are excluded.
Nexus
There will be a new special purpose nexus rule permitting allocation of Amount A to
a market jurisdiction when the in-scope MNE derives at least 1 million euros in
2

This part is based on OECD, Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from
the Digitalisation of the Economy (8 October 2021) (the “Statement”).
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revenue from that jurisdiction. For smaller jurisdictions with GDP lower than 40
billion euros, the nexus will be set at 250 000 euros. The special purpose nexus rule
applies solely to determine whether a jurisdiction qualifies for the Amount A
allocation. Compliance costs (incl. on tracing small amounts of sales) will be limited
to a minimum.
Quantum
For in-scope MNEs, 25% of residual profit defined as profit in excess of 10% of
revenue will be allocated to market jurisdictions with nexus using a revenue-based
allocation key.
Revenue sourcing
Revenue will be sourced to the end market jurisdictions where goods or services are
used or consumed. To facilitate the application of this principle, detailed source
rules for specific categories of transactions will be developed. In applying the
sourcing rules, an in-scope MNE must use a reliable method based on the MNE’s
specific facts and circumstances.
Tax base determination
The relevant measure of profit or loss of the in-scope MNE will be determined by
reference to financial accounting income, with a small number of adjustments.
Losses will be carried forward.
Segmentation
Segmentation will occur only in exceptional circumstances where, based on the
segments disclosed in the financial accounts, a segment meets the scope rules.
Marketing and distribution profits safe harbour
Where the residual profits of an in-scope MNE are already taxed in a market
jurisdiction, a marketing and distribution profits safe harbour will cap the residual
profits allocated to the market jurisdiction through Amount A. Further work on the
design of the safe harbour will be undertaken, including to take into account the
comprehensive scope.
Elimination of double taxation
Double taxation of profit allocated to market jurisdictions will be relieved using
either the exemption or credit method. The entity (or entities) that will bear the tax
liability will be drawn from those that earn residual profit.
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Tax certainty
In-scope MNEs will benefit from dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms,
which will avoid double taxation for Amount A, including all issues related to
Amount A (e.g. transfer pricing and business profits disputes), in a mandatory and
binding manner. Disputes on whether issues may relate to Amount A will be solved
in a mandatory and binding manner, without delaying the substantive dispute
prevention and resolution mechanism.
An elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be available only for issues
related to Amount A for developing economies that are eligible for deferral of their
BEPS Action 14 peer review1 and have no or low levels of MAP disputes. The
eligibility of a jurisdiction for this elective mechanism will be reviewed regularly;
jurisdictions found ineligible by a review will remain ineligible in all subsequent
years.
Amount B
The application of the arm’s length principle to in-country baseline marketing and
distribution activities will be simplified and streamlined, with a particular focus on
the needs of low capacity countries. This work will be completed by the end of 2022.
Administration
The tax compliance will be streamlined (including filing obligations) and allow inscope MNEs to manage the process through a single entity.
Unilateral measures
The Multilateral Convention (MLC) will require all parties to remove all Digital
Services Taxes and other relevant similar measures with respect to all companies,
and to commit not to introduce such measures in the future. No newly enacted
Digital Services Taxes or other relevant similar measures will be imposed on any
company from 8 October 2021 and until the earlier of 31 December 2023 or the
coming into force of the MLC. The modality for the removal of existing Digital
Services Taxes and other relevant similar measures will be appropriately
coordinated. The IF notes reports from some members that transitional
arrangements are being discussed expeditiously.
Implementation
The MLC through which Amount A is implemented will be developed and opened for
signature in 2022, with Amount A coming into effect in 2023.
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b. How Original is Pillar One?
The main conceptual innovation in Pillar One is Amount A, which is to be taxable in
the market jurisdiction regardless of the permanent establishment threshold and
the arm’s length standard.
This idea is conceptually derived from the use of the sales factor by U.S. states to
allocate corporate income as part of formulary apportionment. All US states that tax
corporate income use a sales factor with no requirement for physical presence, and
over half of them use a sales factor exclusively (i.e., tax all corporate income on the
basis of sales). The use of sales as part of the allocation formula dates all the way
back to the first state corporate income tax in 1911.3
In 1993, I first proposed applying this method to international taxation.4 I further
developed this idea in a more extensive fashion in 1996.5 In 1997, I incorporated it
into the first extensive article on how to tax “electronic commerce”, i.e., Internetbased digital activities.6 I wrote as follows:
The permanent establishment threshold, as Jeffrey Owens points out, may have
represented an acceptable compromise when it was first crafted because it
dates back to a period in which physical presence was necessary to conduct
significant business operations. Solicitation through the mail, or through
independent agents, was certainly possible, but had obvious drawbacks: no
direct negotiation with the company's representative, limited ability to
customize orders in the case of mass mailings, and orders took a long time to be
fulfilled. As pointed out above, electronic commerce fundamentally changes
these limitations. Interactivity, speed, and electronic payment mean that
commerce on a much grander scale can be conducted without any physical
presence in the consumer's jurisdiction.

3
Joan Weiner, Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United
States and Canada (2005). According to the Willis Commission Report (1964) as of 1929, 10 of the 17 states with
corporate income taxes employed a sales factor. The current count of states with single-factor sales formulas is 23
(plus DC) and it will increase to 24 effective 2022. See Walter Hellerstein, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX INTO A MARKET-BASED LEVY, J. Taxation 1 (2019).

4
Avi-Yonah, Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation, 56 Tax Notes 1511
(March 15, 1993).
5
Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Texas L. Rev. 1301
(1996).
6
Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997).
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It thus appears that if the goal is to tax the income from electronic commerce in
a way that preserves the underlying rationale of the permanent establishment
rule and the Benefits Principle, a different type of threshold is required, one that
is not linked to physical presence. Such a threshold could be a de minimis
amount of sales into the jurisdiction, as suggested by Walter Hellerstein and
others in the state tax context. For example, the rule could be that if a seller in
electronic commerce has gross sales of $ 1 million or less from a given tax
jurisdiction (adjusted for inflation), it would not be subject to taxation at source.
The same rule also could be used to define a U.S. trade or business for electronic
commerce purposes (in fact, it would be highly advisable to have a uniform
definition of these two terms, as is the norm in many other countries).
The figure chosen should be high enough to exclude most small businesses. The
growth of electronic commerce enables many small business to sell
internationally, and the burden of compliance with various countries' tax laws
could be too much to bear for that kind of business. In addition, the threshold
should be high enough to ensure that, in most cases, the income derived from
the jurisdiction would exceed the costs of complying with its tax laws.
My recommendation is for a gross sales threshold, rather than a net income
threshold, for administrability reasons: A net figure would require that a tax
administration know the taxpayer's income from sales into a jurisdiction, which
it typically would not have the information to determine, while the gross amount
can be determined from the records of other parties (the customers). For the
same reason, a threshold based on a percentage of total sales worldwide seems
impracticable since it requires knowledge available only to the taxpayer.7
This is similar to the way Amount A is defined for purposes of Pillar One, except that
it envisages that all of the income of the multinational would be taxed in this way
without regard to the PE threshold or the Arm’s Length Standard. In later work, I
proposed limiting the sales-based amount to excess returns, and to keep the arm’s
length standard for normal returns, similarly to Pillar One.8
3. The Origins of Pillar Two
The Statement describes Pillar Two as follows:
Pillar Two
7

Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce (1997), supra.
Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 2
World Tax J. 3 (2010); Avi-Yonah, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary
Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2009) (with K. Clausing and M. Durst). The latter paper was cited by the IMF as the
oldest original source of Pillar One. IMF, CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2019), 4041.
8
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Overall design
Pillar Two consists of:
• two interlocking domestic rules (together the Global anti-Base Erosion Rules
(GloBE) rules): (i) an Income Inclusion Rule (IIR), which imposes top-up tax on a
parent entity in respect of the low taxed income of a constituent entity; and (ii) an
Undertaxed Payment Rule (UTPR), which denies deductions or requires an
equivalent adjustment to the extent the low tax income of a constituent entity is not
subject to tax under an IIR; and
• a treaty-based rule (the Subject to Tax Rule (STTR)) that allows source jurisdictions
to impose limited source taxation on certain related party payments subject to tax
below a minimum rate. The STTR will be creditable as a covered tax under the GloBE
rules.
Rule status
The GloBE rules will have the status of a common approach.
This means that IF members:
• are not required to adopt the GloBE rules, but, if they choose to do so, they will
implement and administer the rules in a way that is consistent with the outcomes
provided for under Pillar Two, including in light of model rules and guidance agreed
to by the IF;
• accept the application of the GloBE rules applied by other IF members including
agreement as to rule order and the application of any agreed safe harbours.
Scope
The GloBE rules will apply to MNEs that meet the 750 million euros threshold as
determined under BEPS Action 13 (country by country reporting). Countries are free
to apply the IIR to MNEs headquartered in their country even if they do not meet
the threshold.
Government entities, international organisations, non-profit organisations, pension
funds or investment funds that are Ultimate Parent Entities (UPE) of an MNE Group
or any holding vehicles used by such entities, organisations or funds are not subject
to the GloBE rules.
Rule design
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The IIR allocates top-up tax based on a top-down approach subject to a splitownership rule for shareholdings below 80%.
The UTPR allocates top-up tax from low-tax constituent entities including those
located in the UPE jurisdiction. The GloBE rules will provide for an exclusion from the
UTPR for MNEs in the initial phase of their international activity, defined as those
MNEs that have a maximum of EUR 50 million tangible assets abroad and that
operate in no more than 5 other jurisdictions.2 This exclusion is limited to a period
of 5 years after the MNE comes into the scope of the GloBE rules for the first time.
For MNEs that are in scope of the GloBE rules when they come into effect the period
of 5 years will start at the time the UTPR rules come into effect.
ETR calculation
The GloBE rules will operate to impose a top-up tax using an effective tax rate test
that is calculated on a jurisdictional basis and that uses a common definition of
covered taxes and a tax base determined by reference to financial accounting
income (with agreed adjustments consistent with the tax policy objectives of Pillar
Two and mechanisms to address timing differences).
In respect of existing distribution tax systems, there will be no top-up tax liability if
earnings are distributed within 4 years and taxed at or above the minimum level.
Minimum rate
The minimum tax rate used for purposes of the IIR and UTPR will be 15%.
Carve-outs
The GloBE rules will provide for a formulaic substance carve-out that will exclude an
amount of income that is 5% of the carrying value of tangible assets and payroll. In a
transition period of 10 years, the amount of income excluded will be 8% of the
carrying value of tangible assets and 10% of payroll, declining annually by 0.2
percentage points for the first five years, and by 0.4 percentage points for tangible
assets and by 0.8 percentage points for payroll for the last five years.
The GloBE rules will also provide for a de minimis exclusion for those jurisdictions
where the MNE has revenues of less than EUR 10 million and profits of less than EUR
1 million.
Other exclusions
The GloBE rules also provide for an exclusion for international shipping income using
the definition of such income under the OECD Model Tax Convention.
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Simplifications
To ensure that the administration of the GloBE rules are as targeted as possible and
to avoid compliance and administrative costs that are disproportionate to the policy
objectives, the implementation framework will include safe harbours and/or other
mechanisms.
GILTI co-existence
It is agreed that Pillar Two will apply a minimum rate on a jurisdictional basis. In that
context, consideration will be given to the conditions under which the US GILTI
regime will co-exist with the GloBE rules, to ensure a level playing field.
Subject to tax rule (STTR)
IF members recognise that the STTR is an integral part of achieving a consensus on
Pillar Two for developing countries.3 IF members that apply nominal corporate
income tax rates below the STTR minimum rate to interest, royalties and a defined
set of other payments would implement the STTR into their bilateral treaties with
developing IF members when requested to do so.
The taxing right will be limited to the difference between the minimum rate and the
tax rate on the payment.
The minimum rate for the STTR will be 9%.
Implementation
Pillar Two should be brought into law in 2022, to be effective in 2023, with the UTPR
coming into effect in 2024.
4. How Original is Pillar Two?
Pillar Two is based on what I called in 1997 the “Single Tax Principle”. The Single Tax
Principle can be traced all the way to the adoption of the foreign tax credit by the US
in 1918 and the development of the first model tax treaty by the League of Nations
in 1927. In previous work, I have described the historical evolution of the Single Tax
Principle from its origins through the tax treaties developed by Stanley Surrey in the
1960s, and ultimately to Pillar Two.9

9

Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy, 59 NYLS L
Rev 305 (2015); Avi-Yonah, Stanley Surrey, the 1981 US Model, and the Single Tax Principle, 49 Intertax 729 (2021)
(with G. Mazzoni).
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The first full theoretical statement of the Single Tax Principle can be found in my
1997 article on electronic commerce, in which I wrote as follows:
International income taxation involves two basic questions: What is the
appropriate level of taxation that should be levied on income from cross-border
transactions? How are the resulting revenues to be divided among taxing
jurisdictions? The answer to the first question is the Single Tax Principle: Income
from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once (that is, neither
more nor less than once). The Single Tax Principle thus incorporates the
traditional goal of avoiding double taxation, which was the main motive for
setting up the international tax regime in the 1920's and 1930's. Taxing crossborder income once also means, however, that it should not be undertaxed or
(at the extreme) be subject to no tax at all.
The appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the Single Tax Principle is determined
by the second principle of international taxation, the Benefits Principle. The
Benefits Principle, discussed below, assigns the primary right to tax active
business income to source jurisdictions and the primary right to tax passive
income to residence jurisdictions. Therefore, the rate of tax for purposes of the
Single Tax Principle is generally the source rate for active business income and
the residence rate for passive (investment) income. When the primary
jurisdiction refrains from taxation, however, residual taxation by other
(residence or source) jurisdictions is possible, and may be necessary to prevent
undertaxation. Such residual taxation means that all income from cross-border
transactions, under the Single Tax Principle, should be taxed at least at the
source rate (which tends to be lower than the residence rate), but at no more
than the residence rate.
What is the normative basis for the Single Tax Principle? As an initial matter, this
Article assumes that most countries would like to maintain both a personal
income tax and a corporate income tax. The reasons for having both a personal
income tax and a corporate income tax have been discussed extensively
elsewhere, and are not repeated here. For purposes of justifying the Single Tax
Principle, it is sufficient that most countries in fact maintain their existing
personal and corporate income taxes.
Given a preference for imposing both a personal and a corporate income tax on
domestically derived income of individuals and corporations, it becomes
relatively easy to establish why the Single Tax Principle is justified as a goal of the
international tax regime, on both theoretical and practical grounds. From a
theoretical perspective, if income derived from cross-border transactions is
taxed more heavily than domestic income, the added tax burden creates an
inefficient incentive to invest domestically. This proposition is widely accepted
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and underlies the effort, which by now is about a century old, to prevent or
alleviate international multiple taxation.
The corollary also holds true: If income from cross-border transactions is taxed
less heavily than domestic income, this creates an inefficient incentive to invest
internationally rather than at home. The deadweight loss from undertaxation is
the same as that from overtaxation.
In addition, there is also a strong equity argument against undertaxation of
cross-border income, which applies to income earned by individuals. From an
equity perspective, undertaxation of cross-border income violates both
horizontal and vertical equity when compared to higher tax rates imposed on
domestic source income, and in particular on domestic labor income. In this
case, the argument that equity violations tend to turn into efficiency issues does
not hold, because labor is less mobile than capital and wage earners typically do
not have the ability to transform their domestic wages into foreign source
income.
On a practical level, the Single Tax Principle can be justified because double
taxation leads to tax rates that can be extremely high and tend to stifle
international investment. Zero taxation, on the other hand, offers an opportunity
to avoid domestic taxation by investing abroad, and therefore threatens to
erode the national tax base. T.S. Adams, the architect of the foreign tax credit
and a major influence in shaping the international tax regime, recognized both of
these propositions in the 1920's. In justifying the foreign tax credit, Adams wrote
"the state which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to
relieve double taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the person or
property pays at least one tax." Contrary to an exemption system, Adams'
credit operated to eliminate double taxation by both source and residence
jurisdictions, but preserved residual residence-based jurisdiction to enforce the
Single Tax Principle.
The practical justification for the Single Tax Principle can be seen most easily if
one imagines a world with only two countries, A and B, and only two companies,
X (a resident of A) and Y (a resident of B). If both A and B tax the foreign source
income of their residents and domestic source income of foreigners, and neither
gives relief from double taxation, then both X and Y would minimize their taxes
by only deriving domestic source income (since any foreign tax would by
definition be an added burden). The result would be adequate revenues
collected by both A and B, but no cross-border trade or investment.
On the other hand, suppose both A and B exempted from tax both foreign
source income and domestic source income of foreigners (a not inconceivable
proposition in many developing countries, which tax residents territorially and
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grant tax holidays to foreign investors). In that case, the way for both X and Y to
minimize their taxes would be to derive their entire income from cross-border
transactions. The result would be adequate cross-border trade, but no revenues
for A or B. In a world in which international trade and investment are important,
but taxes (unlike tariffs) cannot be reduced to zero, the Single Tax Principle is the
best option.10
It is clear that the underlying idea of Pillar Two can be traced back to the concept of the
Single Tax Principle, as contained in these earlier developments.11 Specifically, Pillar Two
envisages residual taxation by the residence (or source) jurisdiction when the tax
imposed by the source (or residence) jurisdiction falls below a specified level. This is the
same idea as the one I developed in 1997: “When the primary jurisdiction refrains from
taxation, however, residual taxation by other (residence or source) jurisdictions is
possible, and may be necessary to prevent undertaxation.”12
5. Conclusion
This essay has tried to show that the current revolution in international taxation, as
reflected in BEPS 2.0 Pillars One and Two, is less revolutionary than some have argued.13
Specifically, it argues that the main innovation of Pillar One builds on US state sales
based apportionment, which dates to 1911 and which I have argued since the 1990s
should be applied to international taxation. Pillar Two is based on the Single Tax
Principle, which dates back to the origins of the international tax regime in the 1920s
and which I articulated and developed since the 1990s. Thus, as de Tocqueville argued
for another revolution in 1856, the revolution in international taxation builds on
elements that existed in the old regime it seeks to replace.

10

Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce (1997), supra. I later developed a different normative argument for the single
tax principle, basing it for corporate taxation on the need to curb the power of the largest multinationals. See AviYonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193 (2004); Avi-Yonah,
A New Corporate Tax, Tax Notes 653 (July 27, 2020).
11
This similarity has been noted by other authors. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gil García, The Single Tax Principle:
Fiction or Reality in a Non-Comprehensive International Tax Regime? World Tax Journal (August 2019), 305; Ruth
Mason, "The Transformation of International Tax," 114 Am. J. Int'l L. 353 (2020): “Because states already faithfully
adhered to the no-double-tax norm, growing acceptance of full taxation as a goal of international tax brings states
closer to implementing Avi-Yonah’s “single-tax principle”; Wolfgang Schoen, Is There Finally an International Tax
System? In Kofler, Mason and Rust (eds)., Thinker, Teacher, Traveler: Reimagining International Tax, Essays in
Honor of H. David Rosenbloom (2021), 475 (“What can one say about the “single tax principle”? Has it gained the
status of a guiding and binding principle of international tax law? Here, it is evident that the BEPS Action Plan adopted
Avi-Yonah’s findings to a large extent. International taxation – it claims – should ensure that income from crossborder transactions is taxed exactly once – not more, not less.”).
12
Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce (1997), supra.
13
See, e.g., Ruth Mason, "The Transformation of International Tax," 114 Am. J. Int'l L. 353 (2020).
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